

THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP AND THE FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA

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Introduction

The following paper will deal with the political system of North Korea. I will present the successor to the actual leader of North Korea and the elites that are conducting North Korea. These elites are all connected to Kim Jong Il's family. According to Jae Cheon Lim, a South Korean analyst, Kim Jong Il's family can be divided into branches.¹ The main branch controls the power and symbolizes legitimate descendants who could accede to the throne. They are directly connected to Kim Jong Il and to his biological sister Kim Kyung Hee and to their natural mother Kim Jong Suk. The "lateral branches" are completely isolated from power and are generally living abroad. Members of this branch are connected to the last wife of Kim Jong Il, Kim Sung Ae, and to Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Il's son who indirectly criticizes his father by disapproving the hereditary succession process in North Korea.²

1. The main branch of the Kim Jong Il family

1.1 *Kim Jong Il's children*

1.1.1 KIM JONG CHOL (1981–): THE UNCHOSEN SUCCESSOR

Kim Jong Chol, Kim Jong Il's 29-year-old second son, was considered for a time to be the leader's chosen successor. Kim Jong Chol reportedly began work at the Propaganda and Agitation division of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) after studying at an international school in the Swiss city of Berne. In 2003, efforts had begun to propagate a cult around North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's last known legal wife and mother of Kim Jong Chol, Ko Yong Hee. A similar campaign had been created for Kim Jong Il's deceased mother, Kim Jong Suk, ahead of his succession. However Ko Yong Hee died in 2003 from a breast cancer. For a time he was supported by the First Vice Directors of the Guidance Department Ri Je Kang and Ri Yong Chol. However both of them died in 2010. For a number of years Kim Jong Chol was the rumoured successor. However, he does not have any interest in politics, and may have removed himself from consideration. Kenji Fujimoto, Kim Jong Il's personal *sushi* chef, wrote

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in his memoir *I Was Kim Jong Il's Cook* that Kim Jong Il disliked Kim Jong Chol because his son was too effeminate and had a passive personality. Kim Jong Chol works now in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP.³

1.1.2 KIM JONG UN (1984–): THE NEXT LEADER

More than 20 directives have been signed by the Korean Workers' Party about the succession to Kim Jong Il. The next leader of North Korea is supposed to be Kim Jong Un. Like Kim Jong Il, he was educated at the International School of Berne and is a fan of NBA basketball. In 2009, Kim Jong Un took up a junior level post at the National Defence Commission (NDC)⁴ a few days before the Parliament reappointed Kim Jong Il as the NDC chairman on 9 April 2009. He was expected to assume higher level NDC posts in preparation to succeed his father, but will just be a puppet of the North Korean leadership.

It seems improbable that the most powerful organizations in North Korea would accept a leader without military background. That's why Kim Jong Un was given 4-Star general status at age 28 and then was elected Vice Chairman of the NDC, the most powerful organization in North Korea. In spite of having these positions, Kim Jong Un is in a very different situation in comparison with his father and grandfather. Kim Jong Il was nominated, but he had begun his ascension working first in the party's elite Organization Department before being named a member of the Party Politburo in 1968 and promoted to deputy director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Party Headquarters in 1969. Until 1980 he added positions to his leadership background and was finally confirmed as Kim Il Sung's successor during the Sixth WPK Congress in 1980 at the age of 38. It means that Kim Jong Il worked for at least twelve years in order to get the approval of other North Korean elites. In comparison, Kim Jong Un, who is just 28 years, has no long military and significant political experience. His tutors Ri Je Kang and Ri Yong Chol also died in 2010 in mysterious conditions,⁵ which seems to indicate that the position of Kim Jong Un is not fully secured. Kim Jong Un lacks close associates who can help him. Kim Jong Il had some close assistants, Kim Il and Choi Hyun, during his succession process who truly advised him, considering him even as a nephew. In comparison Kim Jong Un has got everything and is the second most powerful person in North Korea. He doesn't avail himself of real advisors and he's in a way alone. Without any power base, Kim Jong Un must obey the North Korean elites, especially in the event of his father's sudden death.

1.1.3 KIM JONG NAM (1971–): THE EXILED SON

Kim Jong Nam was born on 10 May 1971 to Song Hye Rim, Kim Jong Il's second wife. The eldest son of Kim Jong Il, he moved to study at an international school in Geneva at the age of ten. Kim Jong Nam was at one time believed to be the

successor to his father and expected to take the helm of the communist North. He had been appointed to a senior post in the domestic intelligence agency, and was also a computer enthusiast. As of 2001 he led North Korea's committee on computing in cooperation with South Koreans, and was believed to be responsible for information technology policy. However, a big event occurred in 2001. On Tuesday 1 May 2001 Japanese authorities detained Kim Jong Nam at Narita airport for attempting to enter the country illegally. Kim Jong Nam's weakened position became apparent in 2002, when he spent much of the year in Russia, tending his mother. Although he had previously been touted as Kim Jong Il's heir, after the Tokyo airport incident and the death of his mother, he appeared to be out of the leadership race. As of early 2003 he was believed to be residing in China. Kim Jong Nam's travel habits almost certainly demonstrate that he is not in line to succeed his father to the leadership of North Korea. He travels by commercial scheduled passenger aircraft. There is however a precedent for the regime reinstating disgraced figures after a period of atonement, and in this case, his rehabilitation cannot be excluded. Oldest sons are generally favoured in North Korea, where Confucian traditions that honour seniority still hold sway. Kim Jong Nam was supported by Kim Kyung Hee and her husband Jang Song Thaek, because this couple participated in his education.

1.1.4 OTHER POTENTIAL CHILDREN OF KIM JONG IL

Kim Jong Il is supposed to have other unofficial sons and daughters,⁶ who may not be at the head of the country, but may play key roles in its future. Pak Se Bong, a supposed son of Kim Jong Il, is a member of the NDC. Another son, Kim Hyun, was supposed to have been killed a few years ago. Kim Sul Song, a daughter of Kim Jong Il, is often with her father during public inspections. She was born in 1974 and is fluent in French and English due to her education in Switzerland. She works in Room 99 (the IT department) of the CC KWP⁷ and is a favourite of Kim Jong Il.⁸

1.2 Kim Jong Il's closest family members

1.2.1 KIM KYUNG HEE: THE YOUNGER SISTER

Kim Kyung Hee is the daughter of Kim Il Sung and his first wife Kim Jong Suk, and the sister of Kim Jong Il. She's a key member of Kim Jong Il's inner circle and a director of the Light Industry Department of the Workers' Party of Korea. On 27 September 2010 she was made a general in the Korean People's Army (the North Korean Army) and emerged as a member of the Political Bureau of the CC KWP. In the 70s she worked in the CC of the Korean Women's Association. After 1993 she was at the head of the Planning and Heavy Industry Department of the CC KWP.⁹ This department now also includes the Light Industry section.¹⁰ In 2004, she lost her position but remained a CC KWP member.¹¹ In March 2009 she was nominated

to the Supreme People's Assembly.¹² She and her husband have two children. Their son Jang Kim Song studied in Sweden and currently works in the Organization and Leadership Department of the CC KWP,¹³ of which he is a member.¹⁴ Their daughter Jang Kum Sung, who used to work with her father in the planning and construction of Pyongyang, committed suicide in 2006.¹⁵

Table 1. Kim Kyung Hee's partners¹⁶

Identity	Key responsibilities
Kim Jong Un	Kim Jong Il's successor
Kim Ki Nam	Vice Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Choe Thae Bok	SPA Chairman
Kim Yang Gon	Director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Kang Sok Ju	Vice Premier of the North Korean Government
Choe Ryong Hae	KPA 4-star general
Kim Chang Son	Deputy Director of Kim Jong Il's personal secretariat
Kim Jong Nam	Kim Jong Il's son

Table 2. Main political partners of Jang Song Thaek

Identity	Key responsibilities
Jo Jun Hwang	Deputy Director of Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP
Ri Kwang Gon	Responsible for economic cooperation with South Korea
Hyon Chol Hae	Deputy Director of the Political Department of the KPA
Kim Yong Il	Secretary of Foreign Affairs, CC KWP
Kim Jong Jun	KPA Minister
Ri Ha Il	Director of the KPA Military Department
Kim Myong Guk	Director of the KPA Operational Department
Choe Ik Kyu	Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department CC KWP
U Dong Juk	Deputy Director of the National Security Department
Ri Yong Bok	Party Secretary of the city of Nampo
Ri Ul Sol	KPA Marshal. He was a tutor for Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Nam
Jang Song Hwon	Jang Song Thaek's uncle—KPA general
Jang Song Sop	Jang Song Thaek's brother—Deputy Director of Kim Il Sung University
Jang Song Yol	Jang Song Thaek's brother—Director of the Kim Il Sung Party School
Jang Song Ho	Jang Song Thaek's brother—Deputy Director of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary Party

1.2.2 JANG SONG THAEK: THE UNLOVED HALF-BROTHER

Jang Song Thaek, born in 1946, is often cited as a possible “regent” if Kim Jong Un rises to a top post after Kim Jong Il passes on. Jang owes his power in certain measure to the influence of his wife, Kim Kyung Hee but also to his skills.¹⁷ However, Jang Song Thaek was not in favour with Kim Il Sung (Kim Il Sung didn’t accept the relationship between him and his daughter). Kim Jong Il has had to look after him. Mr. Jang rose through the ranks of the Workers’ Party but disappeared from view between 2004 and 2006. Then he came back to the political scene of North Korea. He was nominated to the NDC in 2009 and accompanied Kim Jong Il during his trip to China. Jang Song Thaek is also the Chairman of the Chinese-North Korean investment bank Taepung.

1.3 The lateral branch of Kim Jong Il’s family

Kim Jong Un is seemingly the next leader of North Korea, having been displayed to North Korea’s cadres in September 2010. He has also apparently launched a purge of senior party and military officials in an attempt to cement his grip on power. In comparison, when his father Kim Jong Il was nominated to succeed Kim Il Sung, he had also to realize some purges and to compete with his half brother Kim Pyong Il, who has been the ambassador of North Korea to Poland since 1998. We will present here the relations between Kim Jong Il and the members of the “lateral branch”.

Very early on Kim Jong Il disliked Kim Pyong Il (b. 1954) due to his mother Kim Sung Ae. Kim Jong Il hated his stepmother because she was indirectly involved in the death of his natural mother, Kim Jong Suk, who died in 1949 from a haemorrhage during childbirth. Kim Jong Suk was jealous of Kim Sung Ae. She preferred to die than watch the betrayal of her husband. Twenty years later, when the succession topic emerged in the mind of Kim Il Sung, Kim Sung Ae proposed to her husband that Kim Jong Il should be at the head of North Korea, Kim Pyong Il at the head of the army and Kim Yong Il at the head of the economy. Kim Jong Il, who was already a growing star of the Korean Workers’ Party, was against this idea. He feared that Kim Pyong Il would be too powerful. Kim Jong Il then defined Kim Sung Ae and her family (including her brothers) and children as the “lateral branch” of the Kim Il Sung family. He wanted to legitimize himself as the only one who could carry the fate of North Korea. According to defectors, Kim Pyong Il was dissatisfied at this treatment—being considered as a member of a family side branch. Kim Pyong Il wanted to be at the head of the KPA. Kim Jong Il refused and tried to find a reason for expelling Kim Pyong Il from North Korea. Differences between Kim Jong Il and Kim Pyong Il really started when the latter entered the Security Guard Bureau following the Panmunjon axe incident on 18 July 1976. According to Bradley J. Martin, author of *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader*, at this time Kim Pyong Il started

to lead a dissolute life with his friends, Kim Pyong Ha and Kim Chang Ha, in his residence in the Taesong district or at his father's house in Amisan. He used to have some entertainment with female members of the People's Army ensembles, offering gifts including watches engraved with his name. His supporters started to scream "long live Kim Pyong Il" all over the country. These acts were of course totally prohibited in the North Korean monolithic system. Kim Jong Il was informed about these events by 15 members of the older generation of the political department, and told Kim Chang Ha to be careful. Kim Jong Il also gave an order to Chon Mun Sop, a director of the Security Department, to launch an investigation of Kim Pyong Il. All material collected was then shown to Kim Il Sung who was angered by the reports. His reaction was immediate. Kim Pyong Il's removal was ordered, and he was for a time discharged from the army. After these events, Kim Pyong Il was no longer able to maintain his dignity and authority in the army and probably from this moment the army's support for him was at least partially reduced. He was then sent to Moscow and to East Germany on the pretext of pursuing academic studies.¹⁸ Next step was Yugoslavia where he was sent as a military *attaché* in 1980. He was then an ambassador of North Korea to Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and now Poland. In this case and being far away, he was not able to coordinate actions against Kim Jong Il.

However, in the 90s, some of Kim Pyong Il's supporters conducted demonstrations on his behalf. In December 1994, fire was exchanged between the followers of Kim Jong Il and the followers of Kim Pyong Il in which eight major figures died and Kim Pyong Il's followers were suppressed. In April 1995 a rumour emanated from Seoul that Kim Pyong Il had been summoned to North Korea, because more than 50 of his followers were confined to their houses.

Kim Pyong Il may be under the protection of the Polish government, like the eldest son of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Nam, who is actually living in China and rumoured to be under Chinese protection. Other sources even suggest that Kim Pyong Il is regularly flying to Vienna and Zurich, where he's running some of Kim Jong Il's accounts. He was not present during the last Korean Workers' Party Conference, which took place in September 2010. During this time, Kim Pyong Il was present during a diplomatic party in Warsaw, and said in perfect English that "the longer I am in Poland, the better it will be". It shows us, how Kim Pyong Il is far away from the North Korean political drama.

Other members of the "lateral branch" were expelled from Pyongyang in the 70s and in the 90s. Kim Jong Ju, Kim Il Sung's brother, is now living with his family out of Pyongyang. In the 70s he was living in the northern part of North Korea. He returned to politics in 1993, being nominated as honorary Vice Chairman of the SPA. In 2010 he lost his political position. Kim Sung Ae and her brothers, Kim Sung Gap and Kim Sung Ho, lost their political power (in the 90s Kim Sung Ae had been Vice Chairwoman of the CC of the Korean Womens' Association). They were even forced

to pay tribute to the biological mother of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Suk. Now nobody knows if they're alive. Kim Pyong Il's sister is living in Vienna and was expelled from North Korea in 1979. Her second brother Kim Yong Il died of liver cirrhosis in 2000. He used to spend his time in nightclubs and casinos all over Europe. Kim Yong Ja, another of Kim Sung Ae's daughters, is married to a KPA general.¹⁹

2 North Korean Elites

2.1 Definition

The elite at the top of the social strata almost invariably puts it in a position of leadership. In North Korea, people who belong to the elites have at least one major position in leading party, government, and military organs. This group includes all political leaders who are directly involved in the preparation of major policy decisions and who participate in the inner circle of policy making. The ruling elite include Political Bureau members and secretaries of the KWP and members of the NDC. It's estimated that they represent a group of twenty thousand people.²⁰

2.2 Actual Elites

Kim Jong Un may be North Korea's heir apparent, but as I explained before, he will be just a puppet of the system. The balance of power might be in a collective leadership — which either the Workers' Party or the army would dominate. Power is actually in the hands of Kim Jong Il and members of the NDC. The North Korean military is directly controlled by the NDC which has been elevated to an independent organization next only to the President of North Korea. This organization is composed of politicians and generals. Its members are the most powerful people in North Korea including Jang Song Thaek, Ju Kyu Jang and Kim Jong Jun. These leaders concurrently hold multiple positions within the party, the government, and the army.

There also some new elites who are connected to the business world, including Jon Sung Hun or Kim Yang Gon, who are at the head of business organizations such as the investment bank of North Korea. Members of the CC are senior managers and also belong to north Korean elites. They include technocrats, economists, managers, and technicians. Elites are directly connected to Kim Jong Il, Jang Song Thaek and Choe Ryong Hae. These people are in their 50s or 60s. These key persons are Kim Kwang Gon, Pak Saeh Bong, Pak Myong Chol and Kim Kyung Hee. They have known Kim Jong Il for at least 20–30 years and they are connected to the main political organizations in North Korea.

Top leaders share a number of common social characteristics. They belong to the same generation. According to my calculations, the average age of the party's top fifty leaders was about 68 years in 1990, 64 years in 2000 and 64 in 2010. By the end

Table 3. Kim Jong Il's family lateral branch

Identity	Kinships	Key responsibilities
Kim Pyong Il	Kim Jong Il's half-brother	North Korean ambassador to Poland
Kim Kyung Jin	Kim Jong Il's half-sister	Wife of the North Korean ambassador to Austria
Kim Sung Ae	Kim Jong Il's step mother	Retired
Kim Jong Ju	Kim Il Sung's brother	Retired
Kim Jong Nam	Kim Jong Il's son	No responsibilities

Table 4. North Korea Elites connected to Kim Jong Il and Jang Song Thaek

Identity	Main position	Connections with Kim Jong Il	Connections with Jang Song Thaek	Other information
Kim Kyung Hee	Director of the Light Industry Department KWP, KPA 4-star general	Kim Jong Il's sister	Jang Song Thaek's wife	No information
Kim Yong Nam	Former North Korean Chairman of the Presidium of SPA	Kim Jong Il's cousin	Jang Song Thaek's cousin	No information
Kim Il Chol	KPA minister	Kim Jong Il's cousin	No information	Former counterpart of Jo Myong Rok
Kim Jong Jun	KPA Vice Marshal	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il	No information	Former counterpart of Jo Myong Rok
Ri Myong Su	KPA Vice Marshal	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il	Close advisor to Jang Song Thaek's brother	Jang Song U's mentor
Kang Sok Ju	Deputy prime minister	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il	No information	No information
Kim Kye Kwan	Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister	Translator's husband to Kim Sung Ae.	No information	Kim Kye Kwan is under the protection of Kim Yong Nam
Pak Kil Yon	Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister	Advisor to Kim Jong Il	No information	Counterpart of Ko Yong Hee and Kang Sok Ju
Ri Yong Mu	NDC Deputy director	Advisor to Kim Jong Il. His wife is a cousin of Kim Jong Il	No information	No information

of 1989, ageing members of the anti-Japanese partisan group accounted for 24 per cent of the Political Bureau's full members and in 2000 for 20 per cent, and in 2010 for 15 per cent. There is no clear evidence of regional under-representation. However, many Hamgyung natives are included in the inner circle, for example the former KPA Leader O Jin U, Pak Song Chol, Kim Yong Nam and Kye Ung Tae.

2.3 Future Elites

Future elites can be split into two categories. In the first category, we've got North Korea politicians who are in their 50s or 60s and belong to the second and third generation. They represent a group of senior North Korean elites' children, who are travelling abroad and more open-minded than the first generation. The second group of elites consist of young people who are in their 30s and 40s. They are illegally importing alcohol and other items from various locations. Their activities include the production and the distribution of counterfeit 100 dollars bills and drug trafficking. This group is led by Oh Se Wan, the son of O Kuk Ryol, a North Korean general. Kang Tae Seung, Kang Jok Su's son (Deputy Prime Minister of North Korea) is also

Table 5. The political leadership in North Korea

Identity	Key responsibilities	Date of birth
Kim Jong Il	Chairman of the NDC KPA Marshal General Secretary of the KWP Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP	1942
Ju Kyu Jang	NDC member Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP Deputy Director of the 2nd Economic Committee	?
Ri Myong Je	Deputy Director of the Personal Secretariat of Kim Jong Il Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP	1929
Yom Ki Sun	Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP	1935
Choe Ik Kyu	Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP	1934
Ri Jae Il	Deputy Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, CC KWP	?
Choe Yong Rim	North Korean Prime Minister	1930
Jon Pyong Ho	Secretary of the Military Industry Department, CC KWP NDC member	1926
Kang Kwan Ju	Deputy Director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland Expert on South Korean and Japan issues	1930
Ri Kwang Gon	Responsible for economic exchanges with South Korea Central National Bank Chairman	?
Jon Il Chon	Director of Room 39 (a bureau that manages Kim Jong Il's finances) and an operator of North Korean companies	?
Jon Sung Hun	North Korean businessman (one of the wealthiest persons in North Korea)	1960s

Table 6. The military leadership in North Korea

Identity	Key responsibilities	Date of birth
Ri Yong Mu	Deputy Director NDC KPA vice marshal	1925
U Dong Juk	NDC member Deputy Director of the National Security Bureau KPA general	1942
Kim Jong Jun	KPA minister NDC Deputy Director	1936
Ri Yong Ho	KPA vice marshal Chairman of the Pyongyang KPA division	1942
Kim Jong Gak	KPA General NDC member KPA Political Department Deputy Director KPA spokesman	1945
Ju Sang Song	KPA general Public Security minister	?
Ri Ha Il	KPA vice marshal Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs, CC KWP	?
Ri Myong Su	KPA general NDC Administrative Director Advisor to the NDC	1938
Kim Kyuk Sik	Close advisor to Kim Jong Il (Kim Kyuk Sik is often travelling abroad)	1940
	Central Army Commission member	
O Kum Chol	Air Force commander	?
Ri Thae Il	KPA general Member of the National Security Bureau KPA Deputy Director	?

involved in these issues.²¹ This North Korean group could be compared to China's "princelings", sons and daughters of Chinese Communist Party and military leaders who amassed fortunes through businesses and their family connections within the ruling Communist Party system.

3. The future of North Korea

The future of North Korea is uncertain. The system is in constant evolution, insofar as new elites are ruling the country. The future of North Korea is dependent on China's behaviour. China is North Korea's most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and fuel. China is helping sustain Kim Jong Il's regime and is against international economic sanctions in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an uncontrolled move of refugees. The number of refugees coming from North Korea is increasing but is still relatively limited. Most of those who leave do

so for economic rather than political reasons. The reunification of the two Koreas is still impossible, insofar as South Korean organizations face problems with North Korean settlers.

The regime has survived many things such as war, famine, international isolation and many other problems. It should not be written off yet, even though there are more imponderables now than before. China, South Korea, and other countries such as Japan do not wish to face a political crisis in the peninsula, for fear of the consequences in terms of refugee outflows and consequences of a potential conflict. The future of North Korea is then dependent on Kim Jong Il's successor and North Korean elites, who will lead the North Korean system, and of course on China and to a lesser degree on Russia. The actual transition of power in North Korea is also a vulnerable time for North Korean elites. Authorities are increasing their grip on society to prevent potential riots. Meanwhile, the nomination of Kim Jong Un as next North Korean leader and the presentation of the new elites may give a new impulse to relations between both Koreas and China. Expectations and stakes are high. Recently, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has urged the North Korean elites to adopt China's economic reforms, arguing that this can lead to eventual Korean reunification. Lee Myung Bak and his administration probably waited for the nomination of Kim Jong Un in order to pronounce these spectacular words. There are hopes everywhere, not only in South Korea, that the new leaders will make the perspective of unification more plausible.

Appendix

Table 7. Kinships in the actual North Korean leadership (as of November 2010)

Identity	Kinships with the Kim Jong Il family	Main position
Kim Jong Il	Kim Il Sung oldest son	Supreme leader of North Korea
Kim Jong Un	Kim Jong Il's son	Kim Jong Il's successor
Kim Kyung Hee	Kim Jong Il's sister	Head of the Light Industry Department, CC KWP
Kang Sok Ju	Kim Jong Il's cousin	Deputy Prime Minister
Ri Yong Mu	Kim Jong Il's cousin-in-law	KPA general
Kang Kwan Ju	Kim Jong il's cousin, on his father's (Kim il Sung) side	Deputy Director of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Kim Ki Nam	Kim Yong Nam's brother	Vice Chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
Yang Hyong Sop	Husband of Kim Il Sung's cousin	Chairman of the Presidium of the SPA
Kang Dok Su	Son of Kang Bo-sok, Kim Il sung's uncle on his mother's side.	Chairman, Choson Broadcasting Corp.
Kang Yong Sop	Kim Il Sung mother's cousin	Chairman of the Korea Christian Federation of North Korea
Kim Jong Su	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Deputy director of the Mangyongdae school
Kim Jong Suk	Kim Yong Nam's wife	Director at the Social Sciences University
Kim Tu Nam	Kim Ki Nam's brother	Director of the Kumumsan mausoleum, where Kim Il Sung is placed
Kim Il San	Kim Il's cousin	Kaesong Mayor
Kim Myung Hee	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Responsible for foreign affairs in the Cultural Department, CC KWP
Kim Myung Woo	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Deputy Director of the Organization and Leadership Department, CC KWP
Kim Sung Hwan	Kim Il Sung's cousin	Deputy Director of Chongjin University
Kim Jong Nam	Kim Jong Il's son	Director of the IT department of the KWP (the so-called Room 99)
Kim Sul Song	Kim Jong Il's daughter	Director of the IT department of the KWP (the so-called Room 99)
Son Song Pil	Kim Jong Il's cousin	Former North Korean ambassador to Russia
Kang Tong Yun	Kim Jong Il's cousin	KPA general
Ko Yong Ho	Cousin of the last wife of Kim Jong Il	KPA general
Kim Pyong Il	Kim Jong Il's half-brother	North Korean ambassador to Poland

Notes

- 1 Jae Cheon Lim, *Kim Jong Il's Leadership of North Korea*, Routledge Contemporary Asia Series, New York 2009, p. 51.
- 2 “Does Kim Jong-nam’s Criticism Reflect Chinese View of North Korea?”, *Chosun Ilbo*, 14 October 2010.
- 3 CC KWP: The Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (CC KWP) is the KWP’s political body. It advises on government policies. *A Handbook of North Korea*, Naewoe Press, Seoul 1996.
- 4 The North Korean military is directly controlled by the National Defence Committee, which is the most important political organization in North Korea.
- 5 “Close Aide to Kim Jong-il Dies”, *Chosun Ilbo*, 27 April 2010.
- 6 Kim Jun Song is another potential daughter of Kim Jong Il (b. in 1975). Kim Jong Il may have other children from unofficial relationships.
- 7 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, *Inside North Korea's Black Box: Reversing the Optics*, [w.] *North Korean Policy Elites*, (red.) Hassig, Kong Dan Oh, Ralph C. Hassig, IDA Paper P-3903, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, June 2004, p. 16.
- 8 Andrew Scobell, *Kim Jong Il and North Korea: The Leader and the System*, Defense Department of the United States of America, Washington 2006, p. 15.
- 9 Kim Jong Ju—http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/kim_kyong_hui.pdf
- 10 *Yonhap News*, 30 November 1998.
- 11 Jung Chang Hyun, *Kim Jong Il of Korea*, Jun Hang Books, Seoul 2009, p. 319.
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- 15 Michael Madden, *ibid*.
- 16 Michael Madden, *Biographical Sketch of Kim Kyong Hui*, April 2010, p. 4.
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- 18 Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader, North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, St. Martin’s Press, New York 2004 r., p. 281.
- 19 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, *Inside North Korea's Black Box: Reversing the Optics*, [w.] *North Korean Policy Elites* (red.) Kong Dan Oh, Hassig Ralph C., Center for Strategic Studies of the CNA Corporation—Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria 2004, s. 19.
- 20 Interview with a defector. The interview was realized by the author in Seoul in June 2008.
- 21 Bill Gertz, *North Korean Elites Linked to Crime*, “Washington Times”, 24 May 2010.